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A School Board's Authority v. A Student's Right to Receive InformationBoard of Education, Isand Trees Union Free School District

No. 26 s. Nco
In Board of Education.IslandTrees Union Free School DistrictNo. 26
v. Pica the United States Supreme Court considered to what extent the
first amendment imposes limitations upon the exercise by a local school
board of its discretion to remove library books from junior and high
school libraries.' The Justices agreed that school boards have broad

discretion in the management of school affairs; however, such discre-

tion must be exercised in a manner not inconsistent with the first
amendment.' The school board may not remove books from the school
library shelves simply because the board members dislike the ideas
contained in those books, thereby restricting access to the political
ideas, social perspectives, and religious views expressed in the books. 4
Earlier the Supreme Court had held in Tinker v. Des Moines School
District- that students do not shed their rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.' Relying on Tinker, the Island
Trees plurality7 extended students' rights to include the right to receive
information as a guarantee of the first amendment. The plurality opinI 112 S Ct. 2799 11982)
2. Id at 2801.
3 Id
4 Id at 28(14.
5 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker dealt with students who wore armband. to show their di..-pproval of the Vietnam war. The school btoard had adopted a regulation prohibiting the wearing of
armbands to school and providing for the suspension of any student refusing to remove the band.
After a claim that such regulation was an unconstitutional denial of student," right.%ol"cxpr ssion
of opinion. the United States Supreme Court held that the wearing of armband.s for purposc, of
expressing ccnatn views was symbolic speech and was within the protection of the firt amendment. Relating Tinker to the facts in Island Trees. the attorney for the plaintil'-students argued
that -if the school board may not ban anti-war symbols, by what conceivable logic would ithave
the right to ban anti-war books? Or anti-American or anti-Christian books?" Brief foi Rcspondent at 16. Island Trees. See also Procunier v. Marinez. 416 U.S. 396 (1974) and Klcindienst v
Mandel. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). cases which establish the first amendment right to know Minarcini
v Strongsville City School District. 541 -.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) is the first case to apply the right
to know as a primary basis for deciding student rights cases.
6. Tinker. 393 U.S. at 506.
7. The Court split into minute fractions. Justice Brennan wrote the courtls opinion, joined
by Justices Marshall and Stevens. and in all but Part 1I-A (1)by Justice Blackmun. Justice.s
Blackmun and White wrote concurring opinions. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist.
Powell. and O'Connor dissented. Rather than attempt to detail each Justices* views and explore
their interplay, this comment concentrates on the plurality opinion, assuming that it will have
substantial weight in future decisions. For further discussion of the divergent opinions. -,cscctions IV. A. and IV. C. infra and text accompanying notes 139-175.
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ion in Island Trees asserted that the first amendment rights of students
must be construed in light of the special circumstances of the school
environment: the special circumstances of the school library make that
environment especially appropriate for the recognition of the right to
receive information!
This note examines the considerations which led the United States
Supreme Court to determine that a school board's authority over the
administration of the schools is not absolute if the exercise of this authority violates the constitutional rights of the students. Second. the
note explores the development of a student's right to receive information through a school library as a guarantee of the first amendment, a
right that cannot be ignored by a school board when the board removes
books which it considers to be inappropriate either because of the ideas
presented in the books or because of the local community's moral.
political, and religious opinions. Third. even though the Is/and Trees
decision offers no final determination on the "right to receive" information issue, this note will point out how the alignment and the analyses
of the Justices will influence the future determination of the issue.
I.

FACTS OF rill CASE

In September 1975 three members of the Board of Education of the
Island Trees Free School District' attended a three-day conference
sponsored by Parents of New York United.'" At the conference the
three members of the board received a collection of excerpts from "objectionable books.""' The three members of the board did not act upon
the list until November 7. 1975 when they searched the card catalog of
the Island Trees High School library.' 2 There. they found cards for
nine "'objectionable books:"' 3 the principal of the junior high school.
acting upon a request from the president of the board, found one addi8

Isdna Tree.$. 102 S Ct at 2809.

9 R,,:hard Ahrens. President of the Board: Frank Martin. Vice-Prcsident of the Board. and
Patrick thughe%. another member of the board.
10. PONY-U. as described by Richard Ahrens. President of the Board. is a conservatie organization
.composed of parents concerned about the education legislation in the state of New
York. Record at A-5. Irland Trees.
I I "'Objectionable" is used to designate those books objected to by PONY-U. No assessmcnt of the quality of the books by educational associations or teachers' groups was used to determine this designation.
12. Ahrens and Manin attended "winter School Night" on November 7. 1975 at the district's
high school. After the event, they -asked" the custodian to let them in the %choollibrary. Once
inside, they compared the list of "objectionable books" received from PONY-U to the library's
card catalog. Record at A-7. I.rland Trees.
13. K VONNEGUT. SLAU(;HTER llOt:St FIVF.:D. MORRIS. Ti:
NAKEI) API. P. TIIOIA.%.
Dow-. Timsr. MI.AN STR.ETS: L flucait.S. BIST STORI.S BtYNF.i;to WITI:.Rs. Go ASK ALIt I.
L.AFlARtI. I.Ati(,iilS(, Boy. R Wit;ia. BLM K Boy. A ClILtusis. A IlLito AINT NOTIIIN(,
Bt'r A SA.wIt[¢( II: and E. CLI;AVIut. SOUL ON 1(-..
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STUDENTS RIGHTS
tional "objectionable book" in the junior high school library.' Subsequently, another school official discovered an eleventh "objectionable
in the approved reading list for a twelfth grade literabook." included
5
ture course.'
The entire board met informally in February 1976 to discuss the "objectionable books" and issued a directive to the principals of the district
schools: the "objectionable books" must be removed from the library
shelves. The president of the school board later presented the superintendent of the district schools with a request that the eleven books be
permanently removed from the libraries. Superintendent Richard
Morrow issued a memorandum to the board and objected to the removal of the books without proper procedures and without further
information. 1,
After an extended controversy, involving the school board, the superintendent, the newspapers and a board-appointed Book Review
Committee. over the suitability of the books, the board permanently
removed nine of the "objectionable books" from the library shelves, 7
returned one book to the shelves with no restrictions."' and returned
one book to restricted shelves in the libraries, requiring parental approval before a student could obtain the book."
Several junior high and high school students, including Steven
Pico,2 brought an action under 42 U.S.C. section 198321 in the District
14

J ARt iii.R. A1 Ri mwtl.t i-OR WRITERS.

15 B. MNALAMI'. Tit Fixt.R.
16. "My objections to direct action banning all the book.%on the list purchased at Watkins
Glen Ilocation of the September 1975 PONY-U three-da, conferencel is that we don't know who
developed the list, nor the critera they used.

. we already have a policy . . . calls for the Superintendent upon receiving an objection to a
btok or books. to appoint a committee to study them and make recommendations." Record at AIti. l and Treer.
I he responsibilities of the Superintendent are clearly described by New York law. One section
of the ,tatutory provisions explains that the Superintendent shall have "supervision and direction
over the enforcement and observance of the courses of study. the examination and promotion of
pupils and over all matters pertaining to . . . libraries . . . and all other educational activities
under the management, direction and control of the board of education." N.Y. Evt'. LAW
§ 2508(61 (McKinney 1981).
I? Timt. FIXI:R: SLAU(,IITEht Ilous Fiv-.; Go ASK ALICE: BEST SIIORT STRIEIs By NERO
WR17i.s: Tiii. NAKI-I) API-. DowN TItkSL M AN STREETS: SOUL ON I: A lERUo AINT NOTiiIN, 81.t A Sqtiwit it. and A READER FOR WRITERS.
Is LAMMINGi BOY
19 BLACK Boy.

20. Steven Pico (by his next friend Frances Pico). Jacqueline Gold (by her next friend Rona
Gold). Russell Rieger (by his next friend Samuel Rieger); Glenn Yarns (by his next friend Richard Yarris); and Paul Sochinski (by his next friend Henry Sochinski).
21. "Every person who. under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia. subjects, or causes to be subjected. any
¢iiien of the United States . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. suit in
equity" -42 U S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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Court for the Eastern District of New York. The students alleged that
the board's actions, taken because of offense to its social, political and
moral tastes, denied the students their rights under the first amendment
of the United States Constitution.-2 The district court granted summary judgment for the board, concluding that the board acted not on
religious principles, but on its conservative education philosophy and
on its belief that the books removed from the school libraries and curriculum were irrelevant, vulgar, immoral, and in bad taste, making
them educationally unsuitable. 23 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court.24
holding that material fact issues existed concerning whether the school
board members, in ordering the removal of the books, acted solely because of political interest and the ideas expressed in the books. The
court of appeals concluded that the students had a right to persuade the
court that the motivations for removal were simply pretexts for the suppression of speech, and that summary judgment was thus improper."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 "
I1. BACKGROUND
A.

HistoricalDe'elopment of School Board Aufhorin'
Control of the administration and operations of local schools has tra-

22 "'ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech. or of the press: or of the right of people
peaceabl, it)
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. (o%%,I
amntend I See (iroGitlow v.New York. 268 U S. 652 11925). which cxpressl% hold% that the hir,1
amendment prohibitions against infringement of free speech are applicable to the staie, through
the due process clause of the fourccnth amendment
23 Pico v Board of Educ.. Island Trees Union Free School l)ist.. 474 1: Supp 3S7
(1-1)N Y 1979). reV'd. 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980. aff-d. 102 S Ci 27')') ci082).
24 Pico v Board of Educ.. Island Trees Union Free School )i.t. No. 26. 638 I 2d 4tM t2d
(ir 1980). uil'd. 102 S Ct. 2799 (1982).
25 638 F 2d at 417 Each judge on the three judge panel of the United State Court 0t1
Appeals for the Second Circuit filed a separate opinion. Judge Sifton delivered the judgment ol
the court lie treated the case as involving an unusual and irregular intervention in the %chool
libraries* operations by persons who are not routinely involved in such matters The school board
members, he concludcd, must be able to show some reasonable basis for their interference ii
matters where they are not normally concerned. Id at 414-IS. The plaintiff-students should have
been ofered an opportunity to persuade a finder of fact that the 'ostensible justifications for the
actions of the school board members.c.
were simply pretexts for the suppression of free speech
Id at 417
Judge Newman concurred in the result: "'the use of gLoscrnmental power to condemn a book
touches the central nervous system of the First Amendment." Id at 432. Judge Newman viewed
the case as turning on the factual issue of whether the removal decision was motivated by the
desire to remove books containing vulgarities and sexual explicitness. or rather by an impermissl.
ble desire to suppress ideas. Id. at 436-37.
Judge Mansfield dissented, arguing that the effect of the majority's decision is "to substitute a
court's view of what student curriculum is appropriate for that of the Board" I at 419
26 Board of Educ.. Island Trees Union Free School Dist- No. 26 v. Pico. 102 S. ('t 385
(1981)
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STUDENT'S RIGHTS
ditionally been the province of school boards. 2 School boards, governed by statutory provisions. - t have the authority to select the
curriculum,2 choose appropriate textbooks."' hire and fire teachers,."
and enter into contracts involving millions of dollars. 2 Additionally. in
principle, the power to select books for school libraries in the district
rests with the school board." although this power. in effect, is normally
delegated to the district's librarians. Where school boards follow rational and detailed book selection policies. 4 they may unquestionably
27 An analysis of the authority of school boards to supervise educational Operation, IN found
in Goldstein. rhe Scope and Sources qj'School Board Authort i
Re
tutae
Student (
an,
anduc"
.Sianlu 4 .VOnc,ainsmtut al.4nalsLr. 117 U. PA. L. Rt-v. 373 (1969).

28 Statutory provisions have expressly conferred certain powers and duties to school boards
.See ALtA (it)*§
1-3-I to-37 (1975): ALASk# STAT. §§ 14.07.075-.170(1982): ARIt. Ri v St .i
AN'. §§ 15-541 to -548 (1956). ARK. STAT. Ar N. §§ 80-101 to -158. 80-201 to -237 11980): ('%1
[:tt t Com §§ 33(XX-08(0. 35100-350 (West 1978); CoLo. Re v S7.AT. §§ 22-2-105 to -109 11978.
('o'..
(I % STAT §§ 10-1 to -46 (1977). I)i L. Cot)m A.. tit. 14. §§ 101-10. 121-31 1
1981).
I) C
Ioto A%.% §§ 31-101 to .119 (1481). F:L STAr AN., §§ 229 011-.131 (West 1977). (;A tot..
§32-4t01 to -445 (1976). i|AWAIl RI
StAT. § 296-2
II).
C1976).
oii(n
to -§332(198I). Ii
A'.%. ST,. ch 122. §§ 10-1 to -23.7 (1961): Is.sm Coim. A%.. §§20-1-1-1 to -11-5
OIurn% 1975). hi),A (liDS ANN §§ 257.1 - 10 (West 1972) KAN SrAr A.Ns §§ 72-120 to -134
(1977). K) Riv Stsr § 156.030- 112 (1980). LA. Riv STAi. AN.N §§ 17:1-174 (Wcst 19821.
Mi. Ri% St,i A*,,. t 20. §§ 51-57. 211-12(1965) M) Etn:r Cot AN.. §§ 2-1012.2-2)1 it.
2M6.3-101 to4-121 197b). MASs. ANN. LAwsch. 15.§§ IA. IG. II. I I(Michie/LawCo-op. 1973).
MIk i. SiAt A.%. §§ 15 10231 Il)-16) (CaIIaghan 1979): MiN. STAT. A.. §§ 121 02-47 (West
11460).Miss Cori A.%§§ 37-1-1 to -9 (1972): Mo A..N. STAT. §§ 161.022-.102 (Vernon 1965).
Mot Coil A-;.s §§ 20-2-101 to -131 11979): Ni a. Ri v. STAT. §§ 79-321 ito -331) (1981): NJ
Ri v Stkr §§ 385021 to 125 (1979); N.H. REv. SrAT. A.s. %§ 186:1-11 (1976): N.J. STAr A.%.%
§§ 18A.4-3 to 4-20 (West 1968): N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2-I to -16 (1978): N.Y. ItIjti
LA%
§§ 17011-1t (McKinne) 1969). N.C. G-N. STAT. §§ 115C-10 to -21. 115C35 to -48 (1983). N 1)
C0 %1 (io
§§ 15-10-)1 to -34. 15-29-01 to -14 41981): Oaio Ri-v. Coin: Am.N §§ 3313.01 to 99
(Page 19N0). OkLA STAT AN.ss. It 70. §§ 5-101 to -135 (West 1972): OR. RtV. STAr. §§ 326011081 11981). PA. SrAi A.-N. tIt. 24.§§ 3-301 to -327 (Purdon 1962): R.I. (;t:N. LAWS §§ 16-1-1 t -7
(1956). S.C Coto A.%. §§ 43-1 to -23 (Law. Co-up. 1977): S.1) Cotnuii.i LAWS A.%. §§ 13-1-1
to -39 (182). Ti.SN. Coli ANN. §§ 49-106 to -116 (1977): Ti.x. RF-v. Civ. STAT. AN. art. 266-17
26 5c.2 (Vernon 1965). UTAII Cow-. ANN.
to)53-1-Il
-17 (1981): Vt. STAr. AN;. tit. lb.
§§ 161-76 (1974 & Supp 1982). VA Coua §§ 22.1-8 to 1-20. 1-2X to 1-87 (1980). WA. !i. Ri V
()o As §§ 28A (4 010 to .285 (1970). W. VA. COiM §§ 18-2-I to -25 (19771. Wi.. SiAt A'..
§§ 40 25- 10 (West 1960). WYo. STAT. §§ 21-2-301 to -306 (1977).
29 S'ee. eg . Ambach v. Norwick. 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Concerned School Patrons & Tatpa,er, v Wdre County Bd. of Educ.. 245 Ga. 202. 263 S.E.2d 925119801./nre Winters. 208N isc 953.
146 N Y S 2d 107 (1955). State v. Shaver. 294 N.W 2d 883 (N.D. 1980).
30 Grosser v. Worsllett. 75 Ohio Op. 2d 243. 341 N.E.2d 356 (1974).
31 Bag Sandy School Dist. No. 100-J. Elben Count) v. Carroll. 164 Colo. 173. 433 P.2d 325
(1967). Riley County Educ. Ass'n v. Unified School Dist. No. 378. 225 Kan. 385. 592 P.2d 87
(19791. Magenhelim v. Board of Educ. of the School Dist. of Riverview Gardens. 347 S.W.2d 409
(Mo 1961)

32. Sims v Etowah County Bd. of Educ.. 337 So. 2d 1310 (Ala. 1976); Surrette v. Galiardo.
323 So. 2d 53 (Fla. App. 1975); Dean v. Armstrong. 246 Iowa 412. 68 N.W.2d 51 (1955). Board of
Coop Educ. Servs. of Nassau County v. Gaynor. 60 Misc.2d 316. 303 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1969): Appeal of Black. 47 Wash. 2d 42. 287 P.2d 96 (1955).
33. See. e.g.. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp.. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980): See
also Comment. Schoolboard. Schoolbooks and the Freedom to Learn. 59 YALE L.J. 28 (1950).
34 See genera/li E. MooN. BOOK SE.CTION ANt) CENSORSHIP IN Till"SiXI S (1969). which
discusses criteria needed for an effective book selection policy. Compare N.Y. Amsis. Cool:,. ti.
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exercise this power and the courts have generally refused to intervene."
Even before Island Trees, however, there were questions about the
power of the boards to later remove from the district's libraries books
which have been previously selected and added to the collection. If a
board attempts to exercise this type of power, it must perform within
the limits of the United States Constitution. specifically the first amendment.36' When alleged violations of first amendment rights 3" are involved, the courts may enter the controversy to ascertain if a school
board has abused its discretion and exceeded its delegated powers.
The reluctance of courts to intervene in actions of local school
boards and officials is based on the related doctrines of in loco parentis" and indoctrination. 3' Additionally. some courts base their reluctance to intervene on the theory that board members are elected
officials and will therefore reflect the community's values and needs."'
I. In Loco Parentis
Originating in the English common law. the in loco parentir doctrine"' holds that school officials stand in the place of parents and
therefore exercise parental authority to direct student academic, moral.
and intellectual development and the authority to control student behavior. This English common law view was adopted by the American
courts4 2- as the course of authority under which the school officials punish students for misbehavior.4 3 In addition, the courts were inclined to
allow the schools to exercise broad parental authority in order to regulate the morals, welfare and safety of students." Schools were later
.. § 01bl)1966), "The bxook collection in the secondary school shall consist of books approved
...au,factor, for 11)supplementing the curriculum. (2) reference and general information.
13 appreciation. and 14) pleasure reading. . . Books of established quality and authority in
,ullicient quantit) to meet all school needs are recognired as necessary tool% and materials of
instruction.

35 President's Counci l)st. No. 25 v Community School lid. No. 25. 457 P-2d 289 (2d Cir ).
cert dented. 409 U S. 998 ( 1972).
36 See ,upra note 22
37 Swart v. South Burlington Town School Dist.. 122 Vt. 177. 167 A 2d 514, ceri, dented. 366
US 925 11961)
38 In locuparenir (Lat.--In the place of a parent: instead of a parent. charged. fatittousl).
with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities. BLA'K'S LAW DRiI-O.ARY' (Oth ed. 1979). In
the place of a parent: as. the master stands toward his apprentice in Iopurepats. BOUVI-R's .- %%
)it 1IONARY (3d revision 1914).
39 're.rdent'r ('ounci. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ.. 562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1977).
41. Mawdsley.In Loco Parent&- a Balancing of interests. 61 ILL. B.J. 638 (1973).

42. Id at 639.
43 Peck v.Smith. 41 Conn.442 (1874); Ingraham v.Wright. 430 U.S. 651 (1977): Gordon v
Oak Park School Dist.. 24 III.
App. 3d 131. 320 N.E.2d 389 (1974). For a discussion of cases
dealing with the school's authonty to discipline students for various types of misbehavior. %ce
Annot. 43 A.L.R.2d 469 (1955).

44. Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ.. 307 F Supp. 517 (C.D.Cal. 1969): Palmyra Bd. of
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given these rights and responsibilities through the enactment of specific
statutes.45 State statutory provisions also create school boards as the
body fundamentally responsible for the direction of the schools;46
therefore, in loco parentis rights and responsibilities were merely extended from the school officials to the school boards. However, support
of the in locoparentis doctrine is diminishing; 47 courts are recognizing
that schools and boards may not assume complete duties of the parents.4" Furthermore, the schools may not interfere with students' private lives through the in loco parentis doctrine.49 The boards must.
therefore, seek alternative theories to establish complete authority over
students.
2. Indoctrination Theory
The second theory, indoctrination, is partially based on legislative
authorization. ." Legislative bodies and the courts recognize that
schools perform socialization and indoctrination functions. : ' Local
school boards must be given broad discretion to shape the minds of the
students to accomplish this socialization goal. Some courts have
adopted this view. In James v. BoardofEducation " the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that the principal function of public education is indoctrinative-to transmit basic values of the community to
the students.5 3 School board decisions may. moreover, properly reflect
local community views and values in the determination of educational
content and analysis used by the schools. 4 The indoctrinative nature
of the schools is not limited to the curriculum.5" Schools may legitiI:duc v Ilansen. 56 NJ. Super 567. 153 A.2d 393 (1959). Seealso Annot. 53 A.L.R 3d 1124
119731. which discusses the teacher's and the school's control over the non-academic activities of
students
45 See copra note 2A
46. See Comment. Schoolb/ard. Schoolbook.f andtheFleedaom to Learn. 59 YAL . L J 929.
930 1950)
47 The school board is not simply the parent to the children of the school district. It is also
an agenc) of the state. Unlike parents. it must operate within the constraint of the Constitution.
Although children have no first amendment rights while at home. they do when they are at school.
'nAer. 393 U.S at 503 (1969).
4$ Baker v. Owen. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
49. Westley v Rosso. 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969).
50. Id
51. See Nahmod. Firrt
Amendment Protection/or Learning and Teaching." the Scope of Judi.
ctalReiew'. 18 WAYNii L. RLv. 1479 (1972).
52. 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.). cert. denied. 409 U.S. I042 (1972).
53. Id. at 573. See also Ambach v. Norwick. 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding a New York
statute forbidding permanent certification as a public school teacher of any person who is not a
United States citizen unless that person has manifested an intention to apply for citizenship. The
Ambach court reasoned that education was an important state function and all teachers must help
fulfill the function of promoting civic virtues and understanding).
54. 461 F 2d 566. 573 (2d Cir.j. cert. denied. 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
55 Id at 573.
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mately be used ,'s a vehicle for inculcating fundamental values.-" The
goal of indoctrination will justify control by the school board over most
educational policies unless there is evidence that fundamental values or
rights are being violated."'
3.

Elected Official Presumption

The final theory which gives power to some school boards is the reliance on the democratic process of election."s Parents and other community persons elect most local school boards. Thus, the assumption
follows that the persons elected reflect the general morals and thoughts
of the community. The courts again are reluctant to interfere with the
decisions of elected school authorities if there is any reasonable educational basis for the board's decisions.5 " For example. in upholding a
dress code specified by the local school board, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals asserted that control of the public schools is committed to
officials who are elected. This commitment requires significant public
control over what is said and done to be placed in the hands of the
school boards."t
B.

Restricuionts on the Exercise of Auihoritr

Although the courts recognize the school board's need to operate free
from judicial intrusion." ' the courts cannot allow an abuse of discretion
which violates students' fundamental rights. 2 Early cases decided by
the federal courts recognized that neither the in loco ptirenui doctrine
nor the indoctrination theory was sufficient to justify an abuse of' discretion and to sustain a violation of first amendment rights."' The
56 .4mbch. 441 U S at 77
57 Eppcron % Arkan,,.,. 393 U S 97. 11)4 (196h)

'X I:ast Ilartford l-duc Ass'n v Bd. of Educ. 562 F 2d 838 (2d ('ar 1 77) S'' ai, ('hi
JuitiLe Burger's dis.ent in Board of t:duc . Island Trees Union :ree School .lDt No, 26 % I'co.
M982).
%%hichsupports the view that parents have a great voice in the adminara102 S Ct. 2799
tion of the schools Justicc: Burger reasoned that a school board is truly "'of the people and h%the
pcple.'" reflrcting the constituency in a very real sense and therefore could not excrclae un°
thrtkcd discretion. Parents can take steps to remove the elected oflicials. Id at 2820-21.
59 1'periwn. 393 U S. at 104.
60
- fiartford.
lt
562 F.2d at 856. Nut ree West Virginia State Bd. of lEduc. v Barnette. 319
U S 624. 638 (1943). which trte., that "Itlhe very purpose f the Bill of Rights was t) ithdraw
certain subjects rrom the vicissitude of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majortes and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts "
61. President's Council Dist. No. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25. 457 F 2d 289 (2d Car.
Ar
1972). For a discussion of Presidentr Council. see Salem. Remoral ofPublic School Lbrari Bra,'
The First Amendment Versus the Local School Boardr. 34 VAMj). L. Ri v. 1407 (1981).
62 Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). invalidating a state law which did not allo, the
teaching of a foreign language to a student unless he had successfully passed the eighth grade
63 Barnette. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that a school board could not require the ,aluttg
of a flag. Brown v. Board of |:duc.. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) reasoning that education was the principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
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Supreme Court in 1943' concluded that "they [school boards) are educating the young for citizenship is reason enough for -crupulous protection of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes."6 ' Continuing for the majority, Justice Jackson stated that no official has the right "to prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or matters of opinion."" The
role of the first amendment is important to assure individualism and
cultural diversity in our society"" and individual rights cannot be made
subordinate to the views of the majority."5
The importance of freedom of expression in the school was reaffirmed in Kerishian v. Board of Regents, 9 which asserted that there
must be vigilant protection of constitutional freedom in the American
schools. "the marketplace of ideas." t" The "future of the country depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth *out of the multitude of tongues
[rather) than through a kind of authoritative selection.* "t In Tinker.
the Court used even stronger language: "In our system. state-operated
schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism."'- School officials do
not possess absolute authority over the students: their authority must be
exercised within justifiable limits in order not to violate fundamental
rights. Students in school as well as out of school are persons under the
Constitution. with uarantees of certain fundamental rights which the
state must respect.
training. .nd in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. Burnside % B,.r.. 63 1:2d
744 itSh Cir 196tih)
Iholding that school officials could not prevent students from wearing "freedom button," and that schtol officials cannot infringe tin student.' rights ito free and unrestricted
expresion as guarantced to them under the first
amendment).
64 Narnie'. 319 U S 624 11943)
h i,
at 6t37
66 Id at 642 Actions of a state making it compulsory for children in the public schools to
,alute the flag and pledge allegiance violated the first and fourteenth amendments. The flag salute
csin. tn,,ade the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the first amendment of the
United Stites Consttution to reserve from all official control.

67

Id at 641-42.

6X
')

Id at 63M.
355 U S 5X9 11967). In Ae..hian. faculty members of the State Unisersity of New York

brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that New York's teacher loaliv
oath laj', w4erc unconstitutional. The Supreme Court invalidated the provisions of1 the New York

lay,, and stressed the importance of saleguarding academic freedom, freedom of tran.;cendent
,alue to all and not merely to the teachers concerned. *'The Nation's future depends upon leader.%
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues. IratherJ than through any kind of authoritative selection.' " Id. at 603 (quoting Irom United States v. Associated Press. 52 F. Supp. 363. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
70f 3X5 U S at 603.

71

Id (quoting United States v. Associated Press. 52 F. Supp. 363. 372 (S.I).N Y 1943))

72 linAer. 393 U.S. at 511.
73 Id The 7nker court asscrted that students may not be regarded as "'closed-circuit recipient'" o only that which the State chooses to communicate.
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Clearly, the courts may intervene in the resolution of conflicts which
arise in the daily operations of school systems and which directly and
sharply implicate basic constitutional values." The courts must, therefore, determine what kind of test should be used to determine if basic
constitutional rights are being violated. The James decision supports
the view that any limitation on the exercise of constitutional rights can
be justified only by a conclusion. "based. .. on reasonable inferences
flowing from concrete facts and not abstractions, that the interests of
discipline or sound education are materially and substantially jeopardized.""' This test would require two factors: (I) a showing that the
school's action violates the students' right to expression; and (2) a
showing that the school's action is not reasonably related or necessary
to the performance by the school of its educational function."
C. Detvelopmenf of Firs Arnendment Rightsfor Studetnis
1. Applicability of the First Amendment to Students
Having determined that school board actions may be violative of the
first amendment if the exercise of authority disregards constitutional
rights, the courts extend the protection of the first amendment to students. The extension of the first amendment to students began on a
limited basis in 1923"" and reached its peak in 1969." In 1923. the
Supreme Court struck down a state law that forbade the teaching of
German in public and private schools."' Twenty years later, a student's
right not to salute the flag was protected by the first amendnent."' In
1968, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the teaching of Darwinian theory of evolution in any state-supported school, " ' affirming the duty of the federal courts "to apply the
First Amendment's mandate in our educational system where essential
to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry."' 2 In Tinker v. Des Moines School Ditrici the Court held that a
local school board had infringed on the free speech rights of high
school and junior high school students by suspending them from school
for wearing black armbands in class as a protest against the government's policy in Vietnam: "the authority . . . of school officials . . .
74. tAPperson. 393 US. at 104.
75. James. 461 F.2d at 571.
76. Id. at 573-74.
77 Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
7X Tinker v. Des Moines indep. Communnty School. 393 U.S. 503 (196'9).
79 .4 lerr. 262 U S. at 390. A state statute in this case prohibited the teaching of Gcrnmn II
the public and private schools and was prompted by the anti-Gcrman fcelings in World Wjr I
NO1 West Virginia v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624 (19431
81 Epperson v. Arkansas. 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
82

Id

at 104.
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must be exercised consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards."' 3 Students do not shed their rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the entrance of the schools." Thus, the school boards

must discharge their important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions within the limits and constraints of the first amendment.
2.

'

Historical Basis for the Right to Receive

The right to receive information has been supported by the United
That year the Court
States Supreme Court in some form since 1943.

invalidated an Ohio anti-soliciting ordinance, implying that the first

amendment protected a right to hear or receive information. 7 In 1965,
this view was re-affirmed by the Court in Lamont v. Postmaster General ."' Mr. Justice Brennan stated that the right to receive information
should be perceived as a fundamental personal right necessary to make
the express guarantees of the first amendment fully meaningful. " Justice Brennan analogizes the dissemination of ideas to the buyer-seller
market: -it would be a barren marketplace . . . that had only sellers
and no buyers." " t Similarly, the dissemination of ideas can accomplish
nothing if willing recipients of the information are not free to accept
the ideas and consider them.'" Finally, the Supreme Court strengthens
the foundation for the right to receive information in the commercial
speech cases. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi:ens
Consumer Council. Inc. '2 the Court extended first amendment protection to commercial speech, arguing that freedom of speech presupposes
a willing speaker. Moreover, the willing speaker is meaningless unless
the protections of the first amendment are afforded to the communication. to the speaker. and to the potential recipients:' -' it is a reciprocal
X3 ImhAer. 393 U S. ,at 507
84 Id at 506
85 Id
N6 Martin % Cit,, of Struthcrs. 319 U S 141 (1943).
87 Id. at 146-47
83 381 US. 301 (19651
89 Id. at 308
90 Id.
91 Seegeneralqy Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) and Klcindienst v. Mandel. 408
U S 753 (1972). supporting the view that the state's attempt to control the content of an individual"s thoughts is incompatible with the underlying principles of the first amendment. The Sianler
court supported the plaintiff's view that he has "the right to read or observe what he pleases-the
right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home." 394 U.S. at
565. The Supreme Court would not later extend Stanley's right to have and peruse obscene
materials in the privacy of his own home to allow the protection of a seller of these materials.
"Whatever the scope of the 'right to receive' referred to in Sianler. it is not so broad as to immunize the dealings'" of routinely disseminating obscenity through the mails. United States v. Reidcl.
,U)2 US. 351. 355 (1971)
92 425 US 748 (1976)
93 Id at 756
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right that can be asserted by the recipient as well as the sender." '
Unfortunately, the courts have not ruled consistently regarding the
right to receive information in a school setting. ' In three major decisions,' federal courts concluded that removal of books from the school
library and/or curriculum violates the first amendment rights of students. Conversely, three other recent decisions" support the view that
removal of books does not alone constitute a violation of first amendment rights.
These six decisions recognize a basic assumption: when first amendment values are implicated, local officials removing a book from a
school library must demonstrate some substantial and legitimate government interest." These decisions do, however, arrive at different
conclusions after that initial assumption. In President'rCouncil. Dif'rit
25 v. Communit School Board No. 25 the court held that the removal
of books from a school library because of educational inappropriateness does not infringe on first amendment rights of students." Moreover, a book that was improperly selected "for whatever reason" could
be removed by the same authority which was empowered to make the
selection in the first place, namely the school board. " " In Zs'kan '.
Warsak• Comtnuniti"School Corporation, the court concluded ihat the
removal from the library simply did not rise to the level of constitutional violations. "iIlt is permissible and appropriate for local boards
to make educational decisions
based upon their personal social, polit1
ical and moral views."" '
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dissented strongly from this
view. In Minarcini v. Strongsville Cit' School District, the court held
that neither the State of Ohio nor the Strongsville School Board "was
under any federal constitutional compulsion to Provide a library for the
students or to choose any particular books".' 2 However, once they
created such a privilege for the benefit of the students, neither body
94 Id.
95. Right to know and right to receive information are phrases which are used interchangcably by the courts. both denoting that the receiver of the information should have certain lirt
armcndment protections in order to make the first amendment rights of pecch and prcss valuable
to the communicator.
96. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist.. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir 1976). Right to Read
Defense Comm. v. School Comm.. 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). Salvail v. Nashua lid of
Educ.. 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.It. 19791.
97. President's Council. Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25. 457 F.2d 289 12d Cr.
1972): Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp.. 631 P.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980): Bicknell v.
Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors. 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
98.

Right to Read Defense Comm.. 454 F. Supp. at 713.

99. 457 F.2d 289. 292 (2d Cir. 1972).
100. Id at 293.
101. 631 F.2d at 1305.
102. ,hnarcini. 541 F.2d at 582.
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could place conditions, related solely to the social or political tastes of
the school board members, on the use of the library. Removal of library books is a serious burden and that burden cannut be rinirnied
by a claim that the book is available elsewhere: the library serves as -a
mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas, specially dedicated to
broad dissemination of ideas." 113 The court relied on the theory of the
"right to receive" from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to conclude
that the students' right to receive information was unconstitutionally
infringed upon when the board removed books because of content.'
In The Right to Read Defense Committee of Chelsea r. School Com-

mittee of Chelsea'0 ' the plaintiffs challenged the removal from the
school library of an anthology containing allegedly "offensive" language. The court agreed that the school board had broad discretion
over the curriculum, however, the board abused this discretion by "sanitizing" the school library of views divergent from their own."' At
stake, the court held was the -right to read and be exposed to controversial thoughts and language-a valuable right subject to First
Amendment protection.' " " In Sa/'ail i: Nashua Board of EIt'ation, " the court ordered the return of MS magazine to the high school

library, holding that the reasons for the removal "' did not demonstrate
substantial and legitimate government interests.'"" Dissents in these
cases argue that the right to receive cannot be interpreted as a fundamental right: such a right has not been accepted by the court and therefore becomes nothing more than a "curious entitlement."''
III.

ANALYSIS OF ISLD4,V

TREES

With the lower courts so badly split on the issue. with no unified
method of analysis, the stage was properly set for a Supreme Court
decision to resolve the conflict and provide direction for the federal
courts. The Island Trees library removal closely parallels the removals
in those cases: objectionable books were removed from the library
shelves by school board members for reasons which were personal.
philosophical, religious and political. B.cause of the conflicting views
Id at 582-83
104 Id at 583
105 454 F. Supp. 703 (D Mass. 1978).
106 Id at 714.
107. Id
log. 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.It. 1979).
109. Cenain school board members objected to adveniscments in MS. plus rcferenc., it)a
'communist- perodical and **communist folk singers."
103

110. 469 F. Supp. at 1275.
III Board or Educ.. Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico. 202 S. ('t. 2799.
2830 119X21
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within the Supreme Court decision itself, it is doubtful that Island
Trees can provide that direction.
A.

District Court

The district court rejected the student's right to receive by adopting a
book tenure concept.'" 2 That court held that school boards cannot be
required to allow all books to remain on library shelves simply because
the books were purchased and because of the purchase deserved to be
kept on the library shelves. This concept. declared the district court,
would "infringe on an elected school board's discretion in determining
what community values were to be transmitted."" ' Thus, the district
court affirmed that school boards may make decisions which transmit
the values and morals of the community. Moreover, the court concluded that restrictions on the use and/or removal of library books
deny no students the right to speech." 4 and refused to recognize the
right to receive ideas. The district court distinguished Island Trees
from Tinker, stating that Tinker clearly involved symbolic speech and
no such claim could be made in Island Trees."5
Court of Appeals

B.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized a first
amendment right involved in Island Trees,"' but determined that the
"concern for first amendment rights must be considered with a cautious
deference to the expertise of educational officials within the academic
environment."" ' 7 Simplistic formulas for balancing these interests by
the courts cannot be determined. The best approach. therefore, is "to
discern lines of analysis and advance formulations sufficient to bridge
past decisions with new facts."' t" Thus, reasoned the court, bare allegations are not sufficient: allegations must be combined with the unusual and irregular intervention" ' in the school libraries' operations by
persons who are notroutinely concerned with such matters.' 2 " Agree112. 474 F Supp 387. 395 (E.D.N.Y
113.
114

Id
Id

115

See rupra note 5

116-

1979).

at 396.

eersupra notes 24-25

117. 638 F.2d at 412 (quoting Thomas v.Board of Educ.. 607 F.2d 1043. 1050 (2d Car. 1979).
rert. denied. 444 U.S. 1081 (1980)).
118 Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ.. 440 F.2d 803. 804 n.I (2d Cir. 1971).

119 638 F.2d 404 (1980). The court pointed out specific procedural irregularities: confusion
over the substantive reasons for removal of the books: a three-month delay before any action was
taken: the exr-postfacto appointment of the Book Review Committee: the Superintendent's opposi.
tion to the board's actions; and, the lack of adherence to established book review procedures
specially developed for situations lake Island Trees. Id. at 417-18.
120. Id

at 414
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ing with the plaintiff-students, the court noted that the books were removed before any concerned school officials had read the books and
the removal was based on mimeographed quotations collected by
anonymous readers.'
The board's erratic and free-wheeling procedures will only result in guesswork; students,
teachers, librarians, and
22
parents have no clear guidelines to follow.
The court of appeals adopted a two-part test to determine if the
school board violated the first amendment rights of the students. The
first part of the test was a consideration of whether the school board has
demonstrated an adequate substantive basis for the removal. The
board may justify potential intrusions into the students' first amendment rights by bringing into action one of the exceptions: protection of
classroom order. protection of the rights of others; promotion of the
psychological well-being of the young: or promotion of standards of
civility and decency among school children. 23 The second part of the
test looked to whether the procedures used by the board to remove the
books were precise and sensitive enough to prevent "chilling" the students' exercise of their legitimate first amendment rights. The removal
must be conducted in a manner that does not express an official policy
of disapproval of ideas if that policy cannot be justified on substantive
grounds.' 24 The court experienced difficulty applying its own two-part
test, but the court did conclude that a trial was necessary to determine
precisely "what happened. why it happened, and whether, in the circumstances of this case, the school board's action . . . created a sufficient risk of suppressing the ideas to constitute a violation of the first
amendment."-:
C.

The United States Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court's review of the decision affirmed
the decision of the court of appeals: the students deserve a trial on the
fact: thus, a remand to the district court for trial is necessary.' 2 ' The
Supreme Court did reveal its thoughts about the development of the
right to receive information as a fundamental right. Initially. Justice
Brennan. writing the judgment of the Court, 27 said that the Court can
limit the number of' questions presented by this case to two:
(I) whether the books originally placed in the school library by school
121. Id at 416.
122. Id
123 Id. at 415-16.
124. Id at 416-17
125 Id at 438.

126. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982)
127

See mpra note 7.
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authorities may be removed; 2 ' (2) whether the court can reverse the
court of appeals on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any
material facts.'
Thus, the Supreme Court deals with the limitations
placed on school boards concerning the removal of books and the
amount of evidence that the respondents have raised." '
Discussing the limitations placed on school boards. Justice Brennan
concluded that first amendment rights of students may be directly and
sharply implicated by the removal of books from the school library.
Removal of books limits self-expression, restricts development, and
limits access to discussions, debates, and the dissemination of information and ideas.'
Furthermore, the right to receive ideas and information is an inherent corollary to the rights of free speech and press. rights
that are explicitedly guaranteed by the Constitution. "2 In addition. the
right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedor.'- Students need a guarantee of the right to receive in order to
prepare themselves for active and effective participation in the society
in which they will be members; they must always remain free to inquire, to study. to evaluate, and to gain maturity and understanding.'
The library is one of the most effective places for students to develop
this maturity and this understanding: the library is the locus of such
freedom. 1..

Justice Blackmun and Justice White concurred in the decision to affirm the court of appeals decision, but for different reasons. Justice
Blackmun suggests that the principle of the case involves a narrower
and more basic right than the right to receive information: the State
may not suppress exposure to ideas for the sole purpose of suppression
of exposure to those ideas without sufficiently compelling reasons,.'"
Justice White refused to consider the constitutional question presented.
Quoting Justice Jackson's opinion in Kennedi, v. Silar Mason Compflj,,i'

Justice White stated that it is "good judicial administration to

withhold decision of the ultimate questions involved in this case until
12M Island 7ee.r. 102 S Ct at 2805.
124 Id at 2806.
130 Id
131 Id. at 28)8.
132 See .upra note 22. This argument is supported by the view that the right It) receive tol-

lows from the scnder's first amendment rights to send ideas.
133 /land 7ees. 102 S. Ct. at 2808.
134 Swcezv v New Itampshire. 354 U.S 234. 250 (I957) is cited bv the Court to ,uprport thi%
proposition.
135. h/and 7ee.s. 102 S Ct. at 2809.
131 Id at 2813
137 334 U S. 249 (1948).
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this or another record shall present a more solid basis of findings."" '

IV.

APPLICABILITY OF ISLAA'D TREES

Several crucial factors effectively restrict any affirmation of the right
to receive ideas as a fundamental right for students. First, the Court
did not reach a majority decision. Secondly. the plurality decision plus
the two concurring opinions only remand the case to the district court
where the case will be decided after the plaintiff-students present their
evidence. Thirdly. neither the plurality opinion nor the two concurring
opinions carefully develop the right to receive as a guarantee of the first
amendment. The dissenting opinions, in addition, clearly show strong
contrary views which will limit the effect of the plurality's opinion. Finally, even if one accepts the initial contention that the right to receive
is a first amendment right, the Court does not clearly enunciate a standard or test to assist other courts in the determination of the restrictions
placed on the actions of school boards.
A.

Plura/i y Decision

The Supreme Court in Island Trees presented a fractured view of the
right to receive information. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of
the Court. joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens. Justices Blackmun
and White filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Blackmun would not agree with the court's discussion of the right to receive
information as a fundamental right, arguing that state discrimination
between ideas is improper.13 9 He concluded strongly that the State
may not deny access to ideas simply because state officials disapprove
of the ideas for partisan or political reasons."'" Furthermore, he reasoned. the focus of the plurality's opinion is the failure to provide information: however, he viewed the singling out of certain ideas for
disapproval and then the denial of access to those disapproved ideas as
the major problem.' 4 ' Justice White refused to side with the plurality
or the dissenters concerning the first amendment rights
issue 4"2 and is
43
dissent.'
Rehnquist's
Justice
in
attacked
accordingly
Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor."' Justice Burger initially argued a poten138.
(1948)).
139.
140.
141
142
143.
144

Island Trees. 102 S.Ct. at 2816 (quoting Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co.. 334 U.S. 249, 257
Island Trees. 102 S. Ct. at 2814.
Id at 2814.
Id at 2814 n.2.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
bland Trees. 102 S. Ct. at 2827 n.I.
Id at 2817.
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Lial question of mootness since the students have graduated." - Moreover, he asserted that the decision will have no precedential authority
on the constitutional issues presented.""' Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor each completed dissenting opinions,' 4 7 with Justice
Rehnquist delivering the stronger attack on the plurality's logic and
reasoning.
Remand to the District Court for Consideration of the Facts

B.

The Justices looked closely at the evidentiary materials to determine
if the respondents presented sufficient facts to maintain an action.
Since the evidence regarding the substantive motivations behind the
board's removal decision would not be -decisive. 4" the plaintiff/students must meet other requirements. The students must demonstrate that the board did not ti'e established. regular. and facially
unbiased procedures for the review of the materials."' The students
here did present evidence to question the methods used by the board.
Other facts also supported the students' claim: disregard for the advice
of the superintendent: disregard for the recommendations of the Book
Review Committee: and the unreliability of the list obtained from
PONY-U.t ' "t This evidence created a genuine issue concerning the critical question of the credibility of the school board's justification for the
decision to remove the books."'
The Pluralitr's"Right to Receire" Argument

C.
i.

Basis of the Right to Receive

The right to receive information proposed by the plurality suffers
from inadequate formulation and the limitations placed on the doctrine
by Justice Brennan. These problems are revealed by a careful analysis
of the dissent of Justice Rehnquist. According to Justice Rehnquist.
the reliance on prior cases to develop the right to receive information is
145

Id

at 2818 n.2

146. Id.
147 Justicc Powell argued that the decision of the pluralt

in,itc.s a judge to oerrulc in

educational decision by the official bod) dcsignated by the people to operate the schools. 102 S

Ct. at 2822. Justice Rchnquist accused Justice Brennan of "newly discovering" a right that is not
substantiated by previous court decisions and points out the problems with Brennan' statements
about acquisitions and removals. Id. at 2827-35. Justice O'Connor merely alfirm. the view that
the school board must surely be able to remove books from the library shelves since it has the
authority to set the curriculum, select teachers, and determine initially what books to purchase.
She did. however, qualify the authority: "as long as it does not also interfere with the right of
students to read the materials and to discuss it "" Id. at 2835.
148. Id. at 2811.
149. Id

150. S'e upra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
151.

/rland Trees. 102 S. Ct. at 2812.
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misplaced: the Court never recognized this right. Rather, past decisions have only concerned freedom of speech and expression, not the
right of access to particular ideas. 5 2 He distinguished Tinker, claiming
that Tinker did not deal with the right to receive information, but
rather with the right to express political views, 5 3 a legitimate and
recognized first amendment right.
The plurality, Rehnquist further argued, should not attempt to apply
cases like Minarcini, The Right to Read Defense Committee, and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy by analogy.' 5 4 Justice Brennan may
correctly assert that the right of access to ideas is an important corollary to the fights of free speech and press.'" but he failed to recognize
the predicate right to speak from which tlie students' right to receive
must follow. This failure reveals a serious inconsistency. The Court
could certainly never hold that all authors have a constitutional right to
have their books placed in junior and high school libraries. Yet, this is
the logical extension of the reciprocal right to receive information.' 5 "
Thus. Justice Rehnquist argued that the right to receive argument will
only succeed when there is a complete denial of access. '" Furthermore, the books which the school board removed from the library
shelves in Island Trees were readily available elsewhere (public libraries and bookstores). Without complete denial of access. there can be no
violation of the students' rights.'"
2.

Public School's Purpose

Another serious gap in the plurality's opinion, according to Justice
Rehnquist, is the lack of recognition of the public school's importance
in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens.'-' To accomplish this goal, the public schools must hold a vital role in the socialization of individuals. Basic skills about society must be taught to
students. In addition, public schools must be able to selectively present
relevant information. The plurality's opinion ignored the fact that education "consists of the selective presentation and explanation of
ideas.""" Educators'
must have the authority to separate relevant
152. Id at 2830.
153 Id. at 2831
154. Id
155. Id at 2808.
156. Id at 2831.
157. Id
158. Id Compare Justice Blackmun's opposing view that the availability of the books elsewhere should make no difference. He argued that difficult constitutional problems would arise tf a
state chose to exclude books. even if those books remained at local bookstores. Id. at 2815.
159 Id at 2832 (citing Ambach v. Norwick. 441 U.S. 68. 71 (1979)).
160 Id
161 Note that Justice Rehnquist does not use the term school board members, rather he czre-
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information from the irrelevant. Logically, therefore, the schools can
only present exposure to limited ideas. Other information and ideas
must be discovered by the students on their own and at places other
than the schools and school libraries. 62 Justice Rehnquist's dissent reflects the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Zikan r.
Warsaw Communiti, School Corporailon."'6
3.

Limitations on the Right to Receive

Perhaps the most serious problems with the right to receive concept,
as presented by Justice Brennan, are the limitations placed on the concept by Justice Brennan himself. First, Brennan confined the right to
the school library: "the special circumstances of the school library
made that environment especially appropriate for the recognition of
the first amendment rights of students. " ' He explored the idea of the
library as a place where students find knowledge, read new material.
and expand ideas.' 5 The use of the Island Trees school libraries was
voluntary and the students used free choice regarding the selection of
what they would read; thus, the library afforded them an opportunity at
self-evaluation and individual enrichment that is wholly optional. Justice Brennan suggested that school officials should not be able to extend
their discretion beyond the compulsory environment of the classroom.""' His comments are all legitimate; however. he gives no reasons
why he would limit this right to receive information to the library setting only.
Justice Rehnquist. on the other hand. argued that elementary and
secondary school libraries are not designed for free-wheeling inquiry. '7 These libraries, unlike public libraries, are tailored to the
public school curriculum and to the teaching of basic skills and
lull%ucss terms like -school officials." "educators." and "teachers" The implication i%.ofcoursc.
that educators arc trained to determine what is appropriate for students Schoxl board member,,
are elected and specific educational training is not a requirement.
162. 102 S. Ct. at 2832.
163 631 F.2d 1300 17th Cir. 1980). In Zskan. the court of appeal. suggcsted that academic
trcedom of students was limited by two factors. First. the students' right to receive and the need to
kno. information is restricted by the level of intellectual development of the student. Secondl.
the role of the secondary schools in the development of intellectual faculties is -only one pan of a
broad formative role encompassing the encouragement and nurturing of those fundamental sMoial.
political, and moral values that will prepare a student to take his place in the community" Id at
1304. Therefore. the community has a legitimate, if not vital, interest in the choice of. the adherence to. and the limitations on a suitable curriculum for the benefit of the students in that community The library should, furthermore. suppon that curriculum through the selection of materials
adaptable to the same social, political and moral values.
164. is/and Trees. 102 S. Ct. at 2809.
165 Id
166 Id
167 Id at 2832.
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ideas.'" Justice Brennan's artificial restriction on the right to the
school library created the possibility of such an attack by the dissent. A
concrete and unqualified affirmation of the fight to receive information
would have been more difficult for the dissent to destroy.
The second limitation on the right to receive is the distinction between the act of removal of previously acquired books and the act of
refusing to acquire a book in the first place. "Nothing in -our decision
today affec's in any way the discretion of a local school board to choose
books to add t.- the libraries of their schools,"' 69 wrote Justice Brennan.
Once again, the reasoning of the plurality opinion made the attack of
the dissenters easier. Either way (whether removed after purchase or
whether refusal to purchase), argued Justice Rehnquist. the students
will not have access to the information.1 0 Brennan's reliance on the
,suppression of ideas" theory neither supported his view nor invalidated Rehnquist's concerns. Certainly a board's action in publicly refusing to acquire a certain book would be interpreted as a suppression
of ideas, a suppression that is just as restrictive as removal from the
libraries of a previously purchased book.'"'
The final limitation on the right to receive information concept is the
use of the motive test. Brennan specified that the first amendment is
violated ONLY if the school board members intended by their actions
to deny access to the ideas with which the board members disagreed. "A forceful affirmation of the right to receive information as a fundamental right would not be subjected to such motive requirement. Restrictions on the right to receive would simply be unconstitutional and
the court would not have to ascertain the intent of the board members.
Otherwise the court will always be confronted with the problem of determining if the books were removed because they were "educationally
unsuitable"'7 3 or because they presented ideas with which the Board
disagreed.""
Also, the motive requirement is inconsistent with the distinction between the acquisition and removal. A school board's acquisition policy
might well be motivated by a desire to promote certain political and/or
religious ideas. Yet, according to Brennan's motive test, this policy
would not violate fundamental fights. Violations would occur only
when the board members attempted to remove books for political or
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173
174

/d
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 2810.
at 2833.
at 2830
at 2833.
at 2810
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religious veiws. t

D. Standardto Appl), in Right to Receive Cases
The Island Trees decision does not provide clear guidelines or standards for other courts. It will not help students determine when their
rights have been violated. Nor will it help school boards know what
restrictions are placed on their authority. Justice Brennan does imply
that a balancing test would be appropriate." 6 balancing the rights of
the local school boards to establish and apply their curriculum in such
a way as to transmit community values with the rights of school students to receive information as an inherent corollary to the first amendment. Brennan does not, however, specify the degree of permissible
intrusion allowed by school boards,' 7 nor. does he specify whether the
actions of the school boards would be subjected to minimum review or
to strict scrutiny." '
175

Id at 2834

176.
177
178t.

Id at 2806-07
Id
Justice Rehnquist would recommend that courts not intervene into the actions of school

boards lie argued that the school board in this case is acting in a special role as an educator and
must not be subjected to intervention by the courts unless basic constitutional values are dtrectl%
and sharply involved. fie would only review first amendment claims arising in the public school
setting with a minimum rationali:y standard, a standard similar to the review of governmental
actions that do not implicate fundamental nghts. Island Trees. 102 S. Ct. at 2829-30. The courts
cannot become the "super censor" of school board library decisions, and thus. decide all issues of
ccnsorship. Justice Rehnquist's view is furthered by several commentators, including Diamond.
The ftrst .4mendment and Public Schools: 7he Case Against Judicial Intervention. 59 Ti.x. L. RLv.
477 (1981).
Other commentators sugf est tte development of guidelines to prevent the need for pudicial
interscntion and the rules to folloif
djudicial intervention becomes necessary. The first commcntatir lists three steps: ( 1) school boards should exercise great care in the initial purchase of schootl
books. 12) school hoards should follow established internal procedures for the review of chal.
lcngcd materials. and (3) boards should develop some objective criteria to evaluate disputed
m.itcrials. This analysis reasons that the boards* actions would be presumptivclK valid, plus the
pro:cdures would hclp to a,.rt removal challenges. especially if students %,
erc allo cd the opportunw to view and comment upon the evaluation processes. Comment. Removal ofPublic School
L.ibrarr Boukj" The frst .4mendment *'erusthe local School Boardr. 34 VANi. L. Ri-.v. 1407.
1434 11981)
The second example suggests that school boards may not exclude an entire system of thought or
viewpoint; ma- not discourage student invesigation of ideas contained in particular books, and
!.hould adoFt procedural safeguards which specify routine and systematic review of the curriculum
And the book selection policies. This proccs judicial review would only be necessary to define
the parameters of the balancing of mterests and to enforce those boundares in particular factual
situations. Note. Sch ol Board Removal of Rooksfrom Librariesand Curricula. 30 U. KA., L.
Ri-v 146(1981l.
Another commentator recommends the reasonable educational judgment standard, a three-pan
tem; .: the courts to use if the procedural safeguards do not prevent confrontations. First. the
courts should regard selection decisions as presumptively constitutional, with the burden on the

plaintitff to show that the decision was not supported by reasonable education judgment Secondl... the school board's burden would be a showing that the actions were taken as a result of
reasonable educational policy determination. Thus. the balance of these interests would rcgnize
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CONCLUSION

In Island Trees the Supreme Court lost a perfect opportunity to enlarge its support for the first amendment rights of individuals and to
clear up the difficult issues of book removal and the right to receive
information. The decision does not settle either issue, neither the
school board's authority to remove books from library shelves nor the
right to receive information as a first amendment right of students. The
decision does, however, reveal the present reasoning of the Supreme
Court Justices and does provide some insight into how the issues may
be settled in the future.
TIMOTHY L. COGGINS

the greater risk of first amendment ifnngcment in the context of book removals when the school
board's motives arc more difficult to detect and its educational policy judgmcnts arc preferred.
Note. Schoolbooks. Schoolboards. and the Conjtutron. 80 CoLuM. L. REv. 1092. 1123-24 (1980).
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